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1. Justification
The specific position of Belarus in Europe
Belarus is the last remaining dictatorship in Europe in which basic European values, such as 
democracy, human rights and the freedom of the media, are repeatedly violated. This isolation 
is further entrenched by a lack of communication and co-operation with the EU: Belarus is 
the only Eastern European country that does not have a PCA (Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement) with the EU; it is the only European country that doesn’t belong to the Council 
of Europe. Yet the importance of dealing with the issue of Belarus is now starkly apparent. 
Belarus is one of the few countries bordering the EU to the East after its enlargement in 
2004, with more than 1000km of shared borderland, and three member countries (Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland) as its neighbours. Furthermore, Belarus is an important transit country 
for Russian gas and crude oil on its way to the EU. 
In the future, we can expect to witness new repressions by Europe’s last dictator and further 
deterioration of the situation in the coming months. Lukashenko will do everything in 
his power to oppress the political opposition, NGOs and the media in order to ensure the 
extension of his rule following the presidential elections scheduled for autumn 2006. The 
first step towards this was taken during the falsified referendum in October 2004 in which 
Lukashenko illegally extended his term of presidency. A Lukashenko presidency after 2006 
will mean the conservation and intensification of his rule and the establishment of a strong 
and dangerous dictatorship along EU borders. 
There are contradictory opinions concerning the situation in Belarus. On one hand, both the 
US and the EU condemned the Belarusian referendum and the elections in autumn 2004, 
whilst the Russian position was one of acceptance. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
declared the referendum transparent and stated that it reflected the will of the Belarusian 
people - yet another example of Russia’s lack of interest in the democratization of Belarus. 
As experience from previous years has shown, co-operation with Lukashenko’s regime is and 
will be, for the foreseeable future, impossible. Despite the EU’s repeated declarations of their 
desire for a democratic Belarus, EU policy has failed. Consequently, the EU must be prepared 
to employ new tactics and to co-operate directly with non-governmental actors, who are 
frequently illegal in Belarus. The non-state sector should now become the main partner of 
the EU and the main beneficiary of EU money (rather than the state which at present receives 
the majority of resources).
Politicians, experts and journalists in the EU very often identify Lukashenko’s anti-western 
and pro-Russian official policy with the opinions of Belarusian society. The reality, however, 
is different. Despite anti-western, anti-European official propaganda, more than 50 percent 
of Belarusians support close co-operation with the EU {whilst simultaneously, more than 
50 percent are also in favour of closer relations with Russia). Closer relations with Europe, 
perhaps even the integration of Belarus into the EU, should remain an open question due to 
the support evident for such policy in a large part of Belarusian society. 
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The Orange Revolution in Ukraine showed that democracy can be built in eastern European 
countries by social movements and that the new Ukrainian authorities are interested 
in European integration. A similar phenomenon can happen in Belarus; and the new 
Belarusian authorities could follow the path of the Ukraine. The EU should be prepared 
for this situation.
2. Two strategies of EU Policy towards Belarus
The EU must formulate new policy towards Belarus as previous policy has been completely 
ineffective. The EU has to openly declare that the promotion of democracy and the gradual 
integration of Belarus into Europe are its priorities in EU neighbourhood policy. The EU 
should not only react to the current political situation in Belarus, but also elaborate its own 
strategy aimed at the democratization of the country. Such actions must be carried out with 
speed due to threatening political time frame in Belarus. The two strategies the EU requires 
towards Belarus are as follows:
• A short-term strategy until the presidential elections in 2006
• A medium and long-term strategy consisting mainly of support in the building of civil 
society. 
Rather than contradictory, these two strategies are compatible and complementary and 
should both be initiated this year. This paper is focused on the short-term strategy.
3. Short-term Strategy
General Recommendations
The European Union should focus on the most important problem from a political point 
of view, namely the possibility of Lukashenko’s third term. The European Council should 
state that a third term is unacceptable according to European values, following European 
Parliament resolution no P6_TA(2004)0045 from October 28 2004. The EU should maintain 
a very clear position and be willing to communicate it to the Belarusian authorities in the 
event of possible future murders, disappearances and instances of further repression. This 
policy must be implemented with a clear distinction: that action is being taken against 
Lukashenko’s regime rather than against the country or Belarusian society.
Better co-operation must be developed and a common position forced concerning Belarus by 
the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and EU member 
states. The neighbours of Belarus, the CEE-Visegrad group and other EU member states 
(for example Germany and the Scandinavian countries) must develop relationships of co-
operation so as to build a broader coalition within the EU with a potential synergy effect. 
There must be a greater level of coordination between the EU and the United States. EU policy 
towards Belarus could be coordinated with US policy towards Minsk (Belarus Democracy Act) 
as both actors have as their final goal the democratization of Belarus. Ukrainian authorities 
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and civil society should be involved in the Belarus issue as Ukrainian experiences are more 
valuable for Belarus than the experiences of other post-communist countries that joined the 
EU in 2004. The EU should discuss the issue of Belarus with Russia but cannot negotiate EU 
policy toward Belarus with Moscow as, unfortunately, Russia has no interest in changing 
either the situation or the regime. In the framework of the EU-Russia dialogue, the EU could 
call on Russia to not allow Moscow to support the Lukashenko regime. 
Concrete actions
These recommendations include both activities against Lukashenko’s regime and proposals 
for action within the EU itself concerning Belarus.
• On 13 December 2004, the Council extended a visa ban given to two high officials that 
were responsible for the illegal referendum and parliamentary elections. Although an 
impressive initial step, such visa restrictions should not be limited to a small number of 
top level officials. Rather, the threat of appearing on a visa-ban list should be both real 
and possible for every official, police officer, judge or others who actively participate in 
the oppression of NGOs, political parties, the media and students or who took part in 
the falsification of the October elections. Conversely, the EU should rethink possibilities 
for the liberalization of the visa regime for ordinary Belarusian citizens, especially young 
people and students. This could take the form of lower visa prices as proof of EU desire 
for good relations with Belarus.
• Specific economic sanctions should be established against Lukashenko’s regime. The EU 
should identify the bank accounts of Lukashenko, high officials and those companies 
which are part of the illegal arms export. The EU and its member states could also identify 
and block the weapons export from Belarus as this is one of the main sources of income 
for the regime.
• The EU must focus on those schemes that promote the activity of Belarusian society, the 
consolidation of opposition forces and the building of pro-European attitudes. Social 
atomization and apathy that is promoted by the regime could be combated by promoting 
a free media and supporting intellectual and civic life in Belarus.
• The EU Commission should create a special task force responsible for planning mass media 
support in or for Belarus in the first half of 2005. The task force should present proposals 
within two or three months. Subsequently, the EU should implement such projects that 
support the Belarusian media, in particular electronic media broadcasting from abroad, 
in the second half of 2005. 
• A similar task force should be established in order to source methods with which to 
financially support delegalized independent NGOs and initiatives. 
• A third task force should find a way to open European exchange programs to Belarusian 
students independently of both the Belarusian government and the school administrations, 
which operate as part of the repressive regime apparatus.  
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• The EU should prepare a unilateral proposal for the EU-Belarus Action Plan by the 
Commission. This is vital as the EU should be prepared for immediate negotiation with the 
new government in Minsk following the end of the Lukashenko era. Furthermore, a draft 
of the Action Plan could act as a signal to the Belarusian opposition and society that the 
EU is developing consistent policy towards Belarus and that it wants to propose concrete 
proposals for future EU-Belarus relations. Guidelines of the draft of the Action Plan could 
be published in the second half of 2005.
• The Commission should establish its direct representation in Belarus. 
• EU member countries’ embassies in Minsk (for instance, Visegrad countries) should 
develop common pro-European activities, for example the preparation of European days 
in Minsk and other Belarusian cities or the establishment of an Info Centre in Minsk.
• A Special EU Representative for Belarus should be chosen, preferably a well-known figure, 
such as a former politician. The Special EU Representative would inform EU institutions 
of the current situation in Belarus, of EU-Belarus relations, and would propose action 
to be undertaken by the EU towards Belarus. Moreover, he or she would make and 
maintain contact with representatives of Belarusian civil society, opposition forces and 
authorities.
• As already proposed, the EU could establish the ‘European Democracy Fund’ (EDF), which 
would act not only in the case of Belarus, but also in other countries with non-democratic 
regimes. Such an institution could act without the agreement of the given country, 
which is especially important in Belarus as the Belarusian authorities do not accept 
programs that support the opposition or civil society. The EDF could support the above 
mentioned activities (media, the promotion of civil society) and could be sponsored by 
the EU budget. Furthermore, the EDF would be an independent institution within the EU 
and would provide relief if other EU assistance programmes could not, due to political 
circumstances or EU regulations.
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